Crampes and Moreaux [1] provide a two period model of competition between a hydrostation and a thermal station for the generation of electricity. We modify this model to make it more directly comparable with an infinite horizon model. The closed loop equilibrium is characterized.
Introduction
Crampes and Moreaux [1] (CM) provide a two period model of competition between a thermal station and a hydrostation for the production of electricity. CM's analysis is both broad and illuminating. However, their model contains implicit assumptions which make it difficult to compare with an infinite horizon model. In this paper, we modify CM's model to facilitate such comparisons, and solve for the closed loop equilibrium.
An appropriately written finite horizon model is essential to the understanding of infinite horizon models. Robles [2] analyzes an infinite horizon model and shows that one can characterize Markov Perfect Equilibria by finding the appropriate closed loop equilibrium to a one year finite horizon model.
A thermal station acts much like any firm. The hydrostation produces energy with (essentially) no variable cost. However, it's output is constrained by the quantity of water in it's reservoir. It can mitigate this constraint by passing water through time, but this ability as well is subject to constraint.
Our model has two main departures from CM's: we allow for an over abundance of water as well as scarcity, and we allow water inflows in all periods rather than just the first. The second departure requires a third; our scarcity constraints are per period rather than global. We observe that in an infinite horizon model: no reservoir is large enough to prevent a firm from forcing it to overflow eventually, and water inflows must occur in more than one period. Consequently, an infinite horizon model must have all the constraints that we have added to the model. For the comparisons carried out in Robles (2009) to be meaningful, a finite horizon model must have these constraints as well. In addition, our departures from CM's model: clarify the role of the various constraints, and allow the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Model
The model runs over two periods labelled . There is no discounting between periods. In each period, the thermal station produces t and the hydrostation produces t electricity. The per period (inverse) demand is denoted
The per period cost function for the thermal plant, denoted  , is increasing and convex:
The thermal plant's installed capacity is large enough that no constraint is imposed.
The hydrostation has no variable costs, but faces a number of constraints. Let t denote the stock of water available at the beginning of period . CM impose the resource constraint 1 
. Like CM, we assume that 1 is set exogenously. However, we allow for an additional exogenous inflow of water between periods which we denote by . Hence,    Consequently, we need a resource constraint for each period. We also include a constraint on the hydrostation's storage; the hydrostation must end the period with no more than S water. We assume that S is sufficiently large that if 1 S S  , then the second period resource constraint can not bind in equilibrium. Further, we re-quire that water is either used or passed to the future; there is no "spilling". This implies the per period hydroconstraints 1 and 2:
.
Finally, we include a non-negativity constraint. For comparison CM: have no overflow constraints, and use a single resource constraint.
Equilibrium
We solve for the closed loop or subgame perfect equilibrium. In each period, firms set output. Demand, t  , is downward sloping and such that each firm's per period revenue function is concave in that firm's own output. We denote the period revenue function for the hydrostation (resp. thermal station) by (resp. .)
In each period the thermal plant acts to maximize profits within that period, . In each period , he satisfies H q S denote the hydrostation's optimal choice. In the second period, the hydrostation's problem is non-dynamic as well. However, he faces no variable costs, but must satisfy the hydro-constraints. The resulting first order condition is 
The LHSs of the hydrostation's two first order condi is is case sta now to a characterization of the various po tions are analogous. However, the RHS of the period 1 first order condition might not be zero. Instead, it reflects the value of water in period 2. The first term on the RHS is the second period marginal revenue, holding 2 q constant. The second piece is the strategic effect. It never negative. It is strictly positive if 2 > 0 q and a second period hydro-constraint binds. In th , an increase in 2 S leads to a decrease in 2 q . In response, the hydrotion will tend to move water from the first period to the second.
We 
The preceding paragraph implies that the second period non-negativity constraint binds in equilibrium if and only if * 2 0 h  . This is as it should be, because the only other re hat a non-negativity constraint should bind is because of a desire to pass water to the future. However, in CM this constraint might bind because of a desire to use more than the entire resource of water in the first period. That is, CM's second period non-negativity constraint might need to do the work that should be done by a first period resource constraint.
